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This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for
campaigning to inform voters. We show existence of equilibrium under
mild assumptions for an arbitrary number of parties. The main result
is that if the parties are more extreme, then they spend less resources
on campaigning (on average), compared with moderate parties. The
reason is the following. Consider voters that are informed by one party
only, say party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the
actual and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters
peak. By concavity of preferences, the increase in payo¤ of voting for
the party that informed is bigger than the increase in payo¤ of voting
for the other party. Thus, the previously indi¤erent voter now strictly
prefers party 1. The e¤ect makes parties gain more votes by informing
when parties are moderate. Since spending increases, voters are (on
average) more informed when parties are moderates.
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11 Introduction
In political science, an important issue is information transmission between
political representatives and the electorate. This issue has several aspects.
One is the question whether parties send truthful information to voters, or
not. This issue has been studied by Banks (1990) and others. Banks …nds
that, if the realized platform of a party is far away from the median of the
voter distribution, voters are able to infer the true platform of that party.
If the platform is close to the median of the voter distribution, this is not
the case. Martinelli (1997) has studied whether voters can learn from parties
that have private information during the electoral process. Schultz (1996)
studies a situation where parties posses more information about the true
state of the world compared with voters. He …nds that polarization leads
to non-revealing sequential equilibria. However, in none of these papers is it
costly to send messages to voters. An important aspect in campaigning is
that it is costly to send information to voters. This motivates the study of a
model with costly information transmission.
The main aim of this paper is to analyze how parties use resources for
campaigning to inform voters. We describe how the resources spent on cam-
paigning depend on how close parties are to each other and how this in turn
a¤ects voters.
We study a general model and are able to show existence of equilibrium.
In the model there is an exogenously given number of parties. Each party has
a predetermined ideology that isdrawn fromsome distribution. Thisideology
could be determined by the history of the group, for example. The parties
care about the number of votes as well as the consumption of some private
2good. Each party has access to resources that can be used for campaigning.
Initially, voters do not know the platform of the parties. To a¤ect the voters
the parties use campaigning to inform the voters about the policy of the
party. The parties are assumed to use only truthful messages. If a voter
is informed by some party, it is assumed that he knows the platform of the
party with certainty. This, combined with risk aversion, makes informed
voters on average more positive to the party. Given the platforms and the
strategies of the parties, voters update their beliefs and then vote sincerely
for the parties.
Then we study a symmetric model with two parties and …nd that, the
farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less information is
supplied (on average) in equilibrium. Note that informing a voter eliminates
the risk of voting for that party. Then, consider voters that are informed
by one party only, say party 1, and assume that the platform of party 1 is
close to the median voter. For the indi¤erent voter, the expected platform
of party 2 is closer to the voters’ peak than the actual platform of party
1. Since voters are risk-averse, the voter would otherwise strictly prefer to
vote for party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual
and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak. Since
voter preferences are concave, the closer to the peak a platform is, the ‡atter
preferences are. This implies that the increase in payo¤ of voting for the
party that informed is bigger than the increase in payo¤ of voting for the
other party. Thus, the previously indi¤erent voter now strictly prefers party
1. The e¤ect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are
moderate. Since spending increases, voters are (on average) more informed
3when parties are moderates. Thus, extremismleaves more voters uninformed.
Also, the uninformed voters are going to be more uncertain if the parties are
further away from each other. The reason is that the variability of spending
goes down.
One of the in‡uences of this paper is Harrington and Hess (1996). In
Harrington and Hess campaigning is explicitly modeled. Parties are assumed
to have a …xed ideology. Parties can use resources either to move their
platform closer to the opponent (positive campaigning) or to move their
opponents platform further away from the party’s own platform (negative
campaigning). However, there is no explicit model of why expenditures can
a¤ect voter’s perceptions of the parties. Thus, the model of in‡uencing voters
is modeled as a black box.
The paper by Chappell (1994) has a more sophisticated model of voter
behavior. In the model campaigning is assumed to be truthful. There are
two parties that can choose either to spend an endowment on campaigning
or not. Thus, only two possible levels of campaigning are allowed. Existence
of equilibrium cannot be proven even in this simple setup. In contrast, in
the model presented here, equilibria generally exist.
In section 2 the model is described and in section 3 existence of equi-
librium is analyzed. In section 4 we study how spending depends on how
extreme parties are and how this a¤ects voters. Finally, section 5 concludes.
42 The Model
Let Y µ < denote the policy space. There is a …nite set of parties, denoted
by P, and a continuum of voters. Let Xk µ Y denote the set of possible
platforms for party k. For all k 2 P, Xk is compact. Let X = £k2PXk denote
the set of platform pro…les. Also, for all S ½ P, let XS = £k2SXk. For each
k 2 P, the platform is drawn from a probability distribution gk : Xk ! <+.
Let pk 2 Xk denote the platform that is drawn. Let p = (pk)k2P and for all
S ½ P, let pS = (pk)k2S. The platforms are not necessarily known to voters.
Instead, they are perceived as uncertain. However, voters (and parties) know
the distribution from which the platforms are drawn. Let g(p) =
Q
k2P gk(pk)
and for all S ½ P, let gS(pS) =
Q
k2S gk(pk). Thus, the probability that a
platform pk is drawn for party k is independent of the platforms drawn for
the parties other than k.
The parties can use resources to inform voters of their platform by cam-
paigning. The parties truthfully reveal their platforms. Thus, a voter that
is informed by party k knows pk with certainty. A motivation for that as-
sumption is that parties repeatedly take part in elections. By observing the
actions of the parties in parliament, voters can infer whether parties have
told the truth. The cost in terms of loss of reputation by sending untruthful
messages deter parties from using such messages. Empirical evidence seems
to justify this assumption. See for example Budge and Ho¤erbert (1990).
Each party k has access to some resource !k ¸ 0, which can be used
either for informing voters or for consumption. Let !max = maxk2P !k. Let
ck 2 [0;!k] denote the resources party k spends on campaigning and vk the
vote share received by party k. A party is concerned about getting as many
5votes as possible, as well as the consumption of some private good. Party k
has the following utility function, de…ned over pairs (ck;vk),
uk(ck;vk) = !k ¡ ck + ºvk;
where º > 0 is a weight re‡ecting the importance of power.1 A motivation for
the assumption that parties care about the number of votes is that the power
of a party depends positively on the number of seats it controls. Another
motivation is that the distribution of the electorate may be uncertain. Then
vk is the probability of winning.
Voters vote sincerely, i.e. vote for the party that gives them the highest
expected utility, given their beliefs concerning the platforms. Since there is
a continuum of voters, strategic voting is not an issue. Let Prk(pk) denote
the voters (common) posterior belief that the true platform of party k is pk.
Posterior beliefs are determined in equilibrium.
The preferences for voters are single peaked. Let xi denote the ideal point
of voter i. All voters with the same ideal point have the same preferences.
Then the population of voters can be described by the distribution of the
voters’ ideal points. Let the density function be denoted by f : Y ! <+
and the cumulative distribution function by F : Y ! [0;1]. Let x denote the
lower bound of the voter distribution, if a lower bound exists. Otherwise,
let x = ¡1. Let x denote the upper bound of the voter distribution, if an
upper bound exists. Otherwise, let x = 1. The …gure below describes the
model if there are two parties.
1The results also hold if uk(rk;vk) is concave, increasing in both arguments, u12 > 0
and vk = µk(ck) where µk is increasing and concave in ck. Then, if rk = !k ¡ck, it follows
that the function W(ck) = uk(rk;µk(ck)) is concave in ck.
6Let V : < ! < be a concave function that is symmetric around zero and
continuously di¤erentiable. The function V : < ! < is assumed to represent
voters’ preferences. We assume that V is concave, symmetric around zero
and continuously di¤erentiable.
Figure 1: An example with two parties.
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Consider party k and suppose that voter i is not informed by party k.















The timing is the following. First, the platforms are revealed to the parties.
Then the parties choose campaign expenditures. Parties have complete in-
formation. Campaign expenditures and initially, platforms, are unobservable
by voters. Otherwise, voters could infer the true platform of a party by ob-
serving the resources spent, since they generally depend on the platform of
the party.
To see this, consider an example with two political parties. Suppose
the strategy of party 2 assigns a di¤erent spending level to each platform
pro…le. Consider a voter informed about the policy of party 1 and knowing
the spending level party 2 but not the platform. The voter can, by observing
the cost, then infer the exact platform of party 2. The parties can observe
the other parties’ expenditure choices, as well as the platforms of the other
parties.
Voters are informed about the policy of party k with probability ½(ck)
where ½ : <+ ! [0;1]. We assume ½(0) ¸ 0, ½(y) < 1 and ½0(y) ¸ 0 for
all y 2 [0;!max]. Also, for all y > !max we have ½(y) = ½(!max). This
assumption is made for technical convenience only. Also, ½ is concave. A
motivation for ½(0) > 0 is that a voter could receive information from other
sources such as newspapers and television broadcasts. Since the population
is large, ½(ck) is also the fraction of the population informed by party k.
Messages cannot be directed to speci…c groups of voters. Also, the prob-
ability that a voter is reached by party k is assumed to be independent of
the probability that he is reached by party j 6= k.
83 Equilibrium
In this section voters update their beliefs when observing signals from parties.
Since voters need to compute expected utility of voting for parties they have
not been informed by, we need to restrict the strategies for the parties to
integrable functions. Let L2[X] denote the set of measurable functions on X




2 is bounded. Let the set of strategies for party k
be
Tk = ff 2 L2[X] j 0 · f(x) · !k for a.e. xg:
Thus, the strategy space for each party consist of all integrable functions
that are smaller than the endowment almost everywhere and bounded in the
L2 norm. A strategy for party k is denoted ck. Let T = £k2PTk.
Let ¸k(A) denote the Lebesgue measure of A µ Xk. For all S µ P, let
¸S(A) denote the product measure of a set A µ XS. Also, let ¸(A) denote
the product measure of a set A µ X.
Convexity and compactness of the strategy sets is shown in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1 For all k 2 P, the strategy space Tk is convex and compact.
Proof. Step 1: Convexity.
Let ck;dk 2 Tk. Then there exists a set Xc µ X such that ¸(Xc) = 1,
where for all x 2 Xc we have ck(x) · !k. Similarly, there exists a set
Xd µ X such that ¸(Xd) = 1, where for all x 2 Xd we have dk(x) · !k. Let
ek = ®ck +(1¡®)dk for some ® 2 [0;1]. Note that ¸(Xc \Xd) = 1. Clearly,
for all x 2 Xc \ Xd we have 0 · ek(x) · !k.
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Thus ek 2 L2[X].
Step 2: Compactness.
Let B = ff j kfk · !kg be the ball of diameter !k. This ball contains Tk.
By Alaoglus’ Theorem, (Royden, (1988)), it is compact. Thus, we need to
show that Tk is closed. Let fcn
kg1
n=1 be a sequence of functions such that cn
k !
ck and, for all n, cn
k 2 Tk. Then, as a corollary of the Riesz-Fischer Theorem
(Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) p. 206), there exist a set ^ X µ X such
that ¸( ^ X) = 1 and a subsequence fc
nl
k g1
l=1 that converges pointwise on ^ X.
Suppose ck = 2 Tk. Then there exists a set U = fz 2 X j ck(z) > !kg such that
¸(U) > 0. Note that ¸(U\ ^ X) > 0 and
R




converges pointwise on ^ X, we have
R




U\ ^ X ck > ¸(U \ ^ X)!k. This
contradicts the fact that c
nl
k 2 Tk for all l.
3.1 Voters Always Reached with Positive Probability
In this section, we only allow ½(0) > 0. This assumption is relaxed in the
next section.
Consider the updating of voter beliefs. Given the information voters get
they use the information to revise their beliefs about the parties. Clearly,
if a party informs a voter, then the voter knows the platform of that party
with certainty. However, if a voter receives information from party k but
not from party j, then the voter knows that party j takes the platform pk
as given when choosing his strategy. For each possible platform pj, given
10the strategy pro…le of party j, there is some probability that the voter is
not informed. Given some platform pj, if the probability that the voter is
informed by j is lower than the average probability of being informed by j,
then the voter increases the weight on this platform pj. This follows, since
being uninformed is more likely when pj is true. A similar argument shows
that, given pj, if the probability that the voter is informed by j is higher
than the average probability of being informed by j, then the voter decreases
the weight on the platform pj. Thus, the voter can use Bayes rule to update
beliefs over the types of party j. This process of revising beliefs would in
general be di¤erent for di¤erent pk, since the strategy of party j in general
varies with pk.
Let c = (ck)k2P. Since ½(0) > 0, there is a positive probability that voters
are informed by the parties in S when pS is true. Then Bayes rule can be
applied and we have the following result. For all S ½ P, all k = 2 S, all z 2 Xk,
pS 2 XS and all c 2 T, the posterior density, denoted Prk(z j S;c;pS), is


















If the expression above can be used to de…ne a probability measure, the
corresponding measure is denoted Prk(S;c;pS). If S = ?, then this is a well
de…ned probability measure, since c is measurable on X. Then, when S 6= ?,
this is also a well de…ned probability measure (Billingsley (1986), section 33).
When studying convergence of measures, we use the weak¤ topology.
To see how expression 1 is derived, let p(S j c;x) denote the probability
11that a voter is informed by exactly the parties in S, given c and x 2 X.
Bayes rule gives








Since the electorate is large the share of the population of voters that is
informed about the platforms for the parties in S, for a given x 2 X, is






[1 ¡ ½(cl(x))]: (3)
Combining expressions 2 and 3 gives expression 1.
The following Lemma showsthat, forall S ½ P, if cn ! c then there exists
a subsequence of fcng1
n=1 such that, for almost all pS 2 XS, the subsequence
converges pointwise a.e. on X¡S.
Note that, if fcng1
n=1 is a sequence such that cn ! c, then, by the Riesz-
Fischer Theorem, there exists a set ~ X µ X such that ¸( ~ X) = 1 and a
subsequence, fcnlg1
l=1, that converges pointwise on ~ X.
Lemma 2 Let fcng1
n=1 be a sequence such that cn ! c. For all S ½ P,
there exists a set ~ XS µ XS such that ¸S( ~ XS) = 1, a set ~ X¡S(pS) = fy 2
X¡S j (pS;y) 2 ~ Xg such that, for all pS 2 ~ XS, ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) = 1 and a
subsequence fcnlg1
l=1 such that, for all pS 2 ~ XS, all x 2 ~ X¡S(pS) , cnl(pS;x)
converges to c(pS;x).
Proof. Let fcng1
n=1 be a sequence such that cn ! c.
Then, let ~ X¡S(pS) = fx 2 X¡S j (pS;x) 2 ~ Xg. By Theorem 22.4 in
Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) there exists a set YS µ XS such that
¸S(YS) = 1 and, for all pS 2 YS, ~ X¡S(pS) is measurable.
12Step 1: Findingmeasurable sets ~ XS and ~ Xc
S such that ¸S( ~ XS)+¸S( ~ Xc
S) =
1, and, for all pS 2 ~ XS, we have ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) = 1 and all pS 2 ~ Xc
S, we have
¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) < 1.
a) Finding ~ XS.
Consider the sets ^ XS = fpS 2 YS j ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) = 1g and ^ Xc
S = fpS 2
YS j ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) < 1g. If ^ XS is measurable, let ~ XS = ^ XS. Suppose
^ XS is not measurable. Let ¸
¤ denote the outer measure associated with
¸. By Theorem 12.11 in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) there exists a
measurable set E ¶ ^ Xc




let ~ XS = YSnE ½ YSn ^ Xc
S = ^ XS. Since ~ XS µ ^ XS we have, for all pS 2 ~ XS,
¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) = 1.
Thus, ~ XS µ YS is a set of platforms for the parties in S such that, given
any pS 2 ~ XS, fcnlg1
l=1 converges pointwise, for almost all x 2 X¡S.
b) Finding ~ Xc
S.
If ^ Xc
S is measurable, let ~ Xc
S = ^ Xc
S. Suppose ^ Xc
S is not measurable. As
in a), there exists a measurable set E0 ¶ ^ XS such that E0 µ YS where
¸
¤(E0) = ¸
¤( ^ XS). Let ~ Xc
S = YSnE0 ½ YSn ^ XS = ^ Xc
S. Since ~ Xc
S µ ^ Xc
S we
have, for all pS 2 ~ XS, ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) < 1.
Thus, ~ Xc
S ½ YS is a set of platforms for the parties in S such that, given
any pS 2 ~ Xc
S, fcnlg1
l=1 converges pointwise on a set Z¡S ½ X¡S where
¸¡S(Z¡S) < 1.
c) Proving that ¸S( ~ XS) + ¸S( ~ Xc
S) = 1.
Note that since ¸S(YS) = 1 we have ¸S( ~ XS) = ¸
¤(YSnE) = 1 ¡ ¸
¤(E).
Also, we have ¸S( ~ Xc
S) = ¸
¤(YSnE0) = 1 ¡ ¸
¤(E0). Also, by de…nition of
the outer measure, we have ¸
¤(E) = ¸
¤( ^ Xc
S) = 1 ¡ ¸
¤( ^ XS) = 1 ¡ ¸
¤(E0).
13Combining these conditions gives ¸S( ~ XS) + ¸S( ~ Xc
S) = 1. Also, from a) and
b), we have ~ XS [ ~ Xc
S µ YS.
Step 2: Proving that ¸S( ~ XS) = 1.
Suppose that ¸S( ~ Xc
S) > 0. Let ¹ X = [pS2YS(fpSg£(X¡Sn ~ X¡S(pS))). If ¹ X
is measurable, let ^ X = ¹ X. If ¹ X is not measurable, there exists a measurable
set E00 ¶ ¹ X where ¸
¤(E00) = ¸
¤( ¹ X). Moreover, since ¹ X µ Xn ~ X and ~ X is
measurable we have ¸(E00) = ¸
¤( ¹ X) · ¸
¤(Xn ~ X) = ¸(Xn ~ X). Let ^ X = E00.
Then we get ¸(Xn ^ X) = 1 ¡ ¸( ^ X) ¸ ¸( ~ X).
Consider
















where the inequality follows from Fubini’s Theorem, and the second equality
since, for all pS 2 ~ XS, we have ¸¡S(X¡Sn ~ X¡S(pS)) = 0. Since, for all
pS 2 ~ Xc
S, we have ¸¡S(X¡Sn ~ X¡S(pS)) > 0, if ¸S( ~ Xc
S) > 0 then ¸( ^ X) > 0.
Since 1 ¡ ¸( ^ X) ¸ ¸( ~ X), this contradicts the de…nition of ~ X. Thus, we have
¸S( ~ XS) = 1.
In reality, parties very seldom change their relative ranking. For example,
democrats always are to the left of the republicans. Thus, we assume the
following.
Separability assumption For all j;k 2 P such that j 6= k, for all y 2 Xj
we have either z < y for all z 2 Xk or z > y for all z 2 Xk.
14Now consider a voter who is indi¤erent between two parties j and k.
Given pS 2 XS and c 2 T, let xjk(S;c;pS) denote the peak of the voter who
is indi¤erent between voting for party j and party k when informed about
the parties in S, if such a voter exists.
The following Lemma shows that, for all S ½ P, if cn ! c and V is strictly
concave, then there exists a subsequence, fcnlg1
l=1, such that xjk(S;cnl;pS)
converges to xjk(S;c;pS) for almost all pS 2 XS.
To give a hint of the intuition behind the proof assume that y < xi < z
for all y 2 Xj and all z 2 Xk. Consider voters informed by the parties in
some S µ P. Then, given that we have found some voter i with peak xi
that is indi¤erent between two parties, moving closer to the party with the
highest platform always makes the voter like that party more. Also, moving
away from the party with the lowest platform makes the voter lose. This
implies uniqueness of the indi¤erent voter. Also, a sequence fcnlg1
l=1 that
converges pointwise almost everywhere a¤ects the voter payo¤ continuously
almost everywhere. This in turn implies that the indi¤erent voter changes
continuously. Note that strict concavity is not used in this informal descrip-
tion of the proof. Strict concavity is needed when it is not the case that
y < xi < z for all y 2 Xj and all z 2 Xk.
Lemma 3 Let S µ P and j;k 2 P such that j 6= k be given. Let fcng1
n=1
be a sequence such that cn ! c. Suppose xjk(S;cn;pS) exists for all n. If
the Separability assumption is satis…ed and V is strictly concave, then there
exists a set ~ XS µ XS such that ¸S( ~ XS) = 1 and a subsequence fcnlg1
l=1 such
that for all pS 2 ~ XS , xjk(S;cnl;pS) converges to xjk(S;c;pS).
15Proof. Step 1: The indi¤erent voter is unique.
Fix c. Suppose j;k = 2 S. The indi¤erent voter is given by xjk(S;c;pS)














Prj(y j S;c;pS)dy: (4)
Suppose without loss of generality that, for all z 2 Xk and all y 2 Xj we
have z > y. Di¤erentiating both sides of expression 4 with respect to xi gives


















Consider any xi, y and z. Since z > y we know that z ¡ xi > y ¡ xi. Strict















Then any voter h where xh > xi strictly prefers party j. A similar argument
works for any other S.
Step 2: Continuity in c.
By Fubini’s Theorem (Royden p. 307) there exists a set XI
S where
¸S(XI
S) = 1 such that, for all pS 2 XI
S, the function cj(pS;y) is integrable on
X¡S. Since ½ is continuous, ½(cj(pS;y)) is integrable. Also, since ½(0) > 0,
1
½(cj(pS;y)) is integrable. Then, let ~ X¡S(pS) = fx 2 X¡S j (pS;x) 2 ~ Xg. Also,
16from Lemma 2, there exists a set ~ XS such that ¸S( ~ XS) = 1, a set ~ X¡S(pS)
such that ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) = 1 and a subsequence, fcnlg1
l=1, such that for all
pS 2 ~ XS and all y 2 ~ X¡S(pS), cnl(pS;y) converges to c(pS;y).
Consider any pS 2 ~ XS \ XI
S. From the assumptions on ½, there exists
some ¹ bk 2 <+ such that, for all z 2 Xk, we have Prk(z j S;cn;pS) · ¹ bk < 1.
Since Prk(z j S;cn;pS) is measurable, by the Lebesgue Convergence Theorem

















for all pS 2 ~ XS \XI




V (z ¡ xi)Prk(z j S;c;pS)dz is continuous in xi, the solution for
xi in 4 is continuous, for all pS 2 ~ XS \ XI
S.
Note that, if there does not exist a voter that is indi¤erent between
party j and party k for all l there does not exist a voter that is indi¤erent
between party j and party k when the strategy pro…le is c. Too see this,
suppose that the expression
R
z2Xk




V (z ¡ xi)Prk(z j S;cnl;pS)dz for all l. Then, by expres-
sion 5, the …rst expression must be larger than the second when the strategy
pro…le is c.
To compute the votes we …rst de…ne
U(k;x
i j S;c;pS) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :




V (z ¡ xi)Prk(z j S;c;pS)dz otherwise.
17Given pS and c, U(k;xi j S;c;pS) is the expected payo¤ for a voter with peak
xi if he is informed by the parties in S ½ P and votes for party k.
For any c 2 T, let
Ok(S;c;pS) = fx
i 2 Y j U(k;x
i j S;c;pS) ¸ U(j;x
i j S;c;pS)8j 2 Pg:
Given S ½ P, pS 2 XS and c 2 T, Ok(S;c;pS) is the set of ideal points of the




f(x)dx then is the mass of voters that prefer
party k.
Also, note that the separability assumption implies that Ok(S;c;pS) is an
interval. This follows, since if any two voters prefer to vote for party k, by
strict concavity of V , any voter in between these two voters strictly prefer to
vote for party k.
Assume that Ok(S;d;pS) is nonempty. Suppose minfx 2 Ok(S;d;pS)g
and maxfx 2 Ok(S;d;pS)g exist. Then there are parties j;l 2 P such that,
given S, there is a voter that is indi¤erent between voting for party k and
voting for parties j and l, respectively. Note that these parties might be
di¤erent for di¤erent S.
Then, for some j 2 P, we have xjk(S;d;pS) = minfx 2 Ok(S;d;pS)g and







If minfx 2 Ok(S;d;pS)g or maxfx 2 Ok(S;d;pS)g do not exist, replace
xjk(S;d;pS) or xlk(S;d;pS) with x and x, respectively. If Ok(S;d;pS) has




18Then, let vk(ck;c¡k j d;p) denote the votes for party k if party k chooses
ck, the other parties choose c¡k, and voters update beliefs according to d 2 T,
for some p 2 X. We have




























Note that, by separability, two parties cannot be perceived as identical
by voters.
Let
wk(c j d;p) = uk(ck;vk(c j d;p)):
Since vk(ck;c¡k j d;p) can be rewritten as ½(ck)A(c¡k j d;p) + B(c¡k j d;p)
and ½ is concave, wk(c j d;p) is quasi-concave in ck. Too see this, …x p and
…rst assume that A(c¡k j d;p) > 0.








¡ 1 < 0:
This implies that wk is concave.
Second, suppose A(c¡k j d;p) · 0. Since
@½(ck(p))
@ck(p) > 0 we have
@wk(ck(p);c¡k j d;p)
@ck(p)
= ºA(c¡k j d;p)
@½(ck(p))
@ck(p)
¡ 1 < 0:
Since the function wk is decreasing in ck(p), it is quasi-concave.
An equilibrium is a strategy pro…le for the parties such that, …rstly, each
party chooses an optimal strategy, taking the other parties’ strategies and
19voter beliefs as given and secondly, voters revise their beliefs given the strat-
egy pro…le of the parties.
De…nition 1 An Informational Nash Equilibrium is a c¤ 2 T such that
i) for all k, c¤
k(z) = arg max
e2[0;!k]
!k ¡ e + ºvk(e;c¤
¡k j c¤;z) for almost all
z 2 X;
ii) for all z 2 Xk, all S µ P, all k = 2 S and all pS 2 XS posterior beliefs
are given by Prk(z j S;c¤;pS).
(7)
The …rst condition means that c¤ is a best response almost everywhere.
The second means that voters use Bayesian updating, according to the pro…le
c¤.
Now consider the best-reply correspondence for party k 2 P, given that
the other parties use the strategy pro…le c¡k and voters update their beliefs
according to c. Thus, for all c 2 T, let
h
¤
k(c) = ffk 2 L2(X) j fk(z) = arg max
e2[0;!k]
!k¡e+ºvk(e;c¡k j c;z) a.e. on Xg:
Clearly h¤
k : T ! Tk. Let h¤ = (h¤
k)k2P. Then h¤ : T ! T.
Since expression wk(c j d;p) is quasi-concave in ck, convex-valuedness of
h¤ follows.
The following Lemma shows that h¤ has a closed graph.
Lemma 4 If the Separability assumption is satis…ed and V is strictly con-
cave, h¤ has a closed graph.
20Proof. Step 1: vk(fk;c¡k j c;p) continuous in (fk;c) a.e. on X.
Again let fcng1
n=1 be a sequence such that cn ! c and let ffn
k g1
n=1 be
a sequence such that fn
k 2 h¤
k(cn) for all n and fn
k ! fk. Then, by the
Riesz-Fischer Theorem, there exists a subsequence fcnrg1
r=1 that converges
pointwise a.e. on X. Corresponding to fcnrg1








r0=1 that converges pointwise a.e. on X. Then, let ^ X µ X de-
note the set of platforms such that cnr0 and f
nr0
k converge pointwise. Clearly,
¸( ^ X) = 1.
As in Lemma 3 there exists a set XI
S where ¸S(XI
S) = 1 such that, for all
pS 2 XI
S and all j 2 PnS, the function cj(pS;y) is integrable on X¡S. Let
~ X(S) = f(pS;y) 2 X j pS = 2 ~ XS\XI
Sg. FromLemma 2 we have ¸( ~ X(S)) = 0.
Let ~ X¤ = ^ Xnf[SµP ~ X(S)g. Since ¸( ~ X(S)) = 0 for all S µ P and P is …nite,
¸( ~ X¤) = 1. Then, since cnr0 converge pointwise, xjk(S;cnr0;pS) converges





converges to vk(fk;c¡k j c;p) for all p 2 ~ X¤ such that ¸( ~ X¤) = 1.
Step 2: f 2 h¤(c).
Step 1 implies that
fk(p) = arg max
e2[0;!k]
!k ¡ e + ºvk(e;c¡k j c;p)
for all k and all p 2 ~ X¤nU where U ½ ~ X¤ and ¸(U) = 0. Suppose ¸(U) > 0.
Then, for all p 2 U,
fk(p) 6= arg max
e2[0;!k]
!k ¡ e + ºvk(e;c¡k j c;p):
Clearly f
nr0
k and cnr0 converges pointwise on U \ ~ X¤ where ¸(U \ ~ X¤) > 0 By
Egoro¤’s Theorem, there exists a set ^ U µ U \ ~ X¤ such that ¸(^ U) > 0 where
21f
nr0
k and cnr0 converge uniformly on ^ U. Thus, for all p 2 ^ U, there exists a
number ^ r such that, for all r0 > ^ r we have
f
nr0
k (p) 6= arg max
e2[0;!k]




contradicting the de…nition of ffnr0g1
r0=1. Thus, f 2 h¤(c). Thus h¤ has a
closed graph.
By using Lemma 4 we are now able to show existence.
Proposition 1 If the Separability assumption is satis…ed and V is strictly
concave, there exists an Informational Nash Equilibrium c¤.
Proof. Note that by Lemmas 1, 4 above and Theorem 14.49 in Aliprantis
and Border (1994), a …xed point c¤ = h¤(c¤) exists. Then, for all p 2 X, all
























Also, given these beliefs and by the construction of the mapping h¤, c¤ sat-
is…es i) for all k 2 P. Thus c¤ is an Informational Nash Equilibrium.
The main idea behind the proof is to start with some arbitrary strategy
pro…le for the parties and let voters revise their beliefs according to this
strategy pro…le. Given this pro…le and the revised beliefs, each party chooses
an optimal strategy. Thus, we construct a mapping from the set of strategy
pro…lesto itself. Then a …xed point theoremcan be applied to show existence.
223.2 Allowing ½(0) = 0
Note that, if ½(0) = 0, the probability measures de…ned in expression 1 need
not be well de…ned.
Let
½
n(y) = ½(y) +
1 ¡ ½(!max)
2n
for all y 2 [0;!max].
Since ½(!max) < 1 we have 0 < ½n(y) < 1 for all y 2 [0;!max]. Also,
@½n(y)
@y = ½0(y) ¸ 0 for all y 2 [0;!max]. Then ½n converges pointwise to ½ as
n ! 1. Since ½ is concave, ½n is concave.
Say that c is an INE a.e. if the pro…le c satis…es the requirement ii) in
expression 7 almost everywhere. Thus, we require that beliefs are updated
according to c¤ almost everywhere.
De…nition 2 The pro…le c¤ 2 T is an Informational Nash Equilibrium
a.e. if
i) for all k, c¤
k(z) = arg max
e2[0;!k]
!k ¡ e + ºvk(e;c¤
¡k j c¤;z) for almost all
z 2 X;
ii) for all z 2 Xk, all S µ P, all k = 2 S there exists ZS µ XS where
¸S(ZS) = 1 such that for all pS 2 ZS, posterior beliefs are given by
Prk(z j S;c¤;pS) when Bayes rule applies.
(8)
The following result shows existence of an INE a.e.
23Theorem 1 If ½(0) = 0 there exists a c¤ 2 T such that c¤ is an INE a.e.
Proof. Step 1: The candidate equilibrium pro…le and beliefs.
Consider a sequence f½ng1
n=1. Since ½n is concave, for each n, an equi-
librium c¤n 2 T exists by Proposition 1. Let fc¤ng1
n=1 denote a sequence of
such equilibria. Since T is compact there exists a convergent subsequence,
fc¤ngg1
g=1 with limit c¤ 2 T. Also, for all n, all S ½ P and all k = 2 S,
there exists a probability measure, Prk(S;c¤n;pS) de…ned as in expression 1.
Note that, since X is compact, any such measure is tight. Also, note that,
by the Riesz-Fischer Theorem, there exists a further subsequence fc¤nhg1
h=1
that converges pointwise a.e. on X.
Step 2: Existence of limit probability measures.
Consider the subsequence fc¤nhg1
h=1. Fix S ½ P and k = 2 S. Take
the subsequence of measures corresponding to this subsequence. Denote
the elements of this subsequence Prk(S;c¤nh;pS). Then, by Helly’s Theo-
rem (Billingsley (1986), p. 392) there exists a further subsequence of mea-





l=1 denote the subsequence of equilibria corresponding to the subse-
quence of measures. Clearly, this sequence is a subsequence of fc¤nhg1
h=1.
Thus, Prk(S;c
¤nhl;pS) converges weakly to Pr
¤
k(S;pS). By repeating this ar-
gument for all S ½ P and all k = 2 S there exists a subsequence fc
¤nhqg1
q=1
such that, for all S ½ P, all k = 2 S , Prk(S;c




Step 3: Proof that c¤ is a best response, given limit beliefs.
Consider the subsequence fc
¤nhqg1
q=1. This subsequence converges point-
wise on ~ X, such that ¸( ~ X) = 1. Note that, since c
¤nhq(v) converges to c¤(v)
24for any v 2 ~ X then ½n(c
¤nhq(v)) converges to ½(c¤(v)). Since the sequence of
measures converges weakly, for all S ½ P, for all k = 2 S and all pS 2 XS, we
have, by the weak¤ topology
Z
z2Xk





V (z ¡ x
i)Prk(z j S;pS)dz
for all xi 2 Y .
When voter beliefs are given by Pr
¤
k(S;pS) for all j;k 2 P, all S ½ P
and all pS 2 XS, let x¤
jk(S;pS) denote the peak of the indi¤erent voter, when
informed by just the parties in S ½ P and when pS 2 XS is true.
By a continuity argument similar to step 2 in Lemma 3, for all S µ P and
all pS 2 XS, xjk(S;c
¤nhq;pS) converges to x¤
jk(S;pS) for all j;k 2 P. Also,
for all v 2 ~ X, since c
¤nhq(v) converges to c¤(v) and ½n converges pointwise to
½ it follows that ½n(c
¤nhq(v)) converges to ½(c¤(v)). Then vk(c
¤nhq j c
¤nhq;v)
converges to vk(c¤ j c¤;v) for all v 2 ~ X. By an argument identical to the
argument in Step 2 in Lemma 4, c¤ 2 h(c¤).
Step 4: Proof that limit beliefs result from c¤.
Consider the sequence fc
¤nhqg1
q=1. For any S ½ P, k = 2 S, let
C(S;c
¤;pS) = fv¡S 2 X¡S j c
¤
k(pS;v¡S) > 08k 2 Sg:
Thus, C(S;c¤;pS) consists of all the platforms of the parties not in S such
all parties in S spends a positive amount, given c¤ and pS.
Fix some S ½ P and pS 2 XS.
Case 1: ¸¡S(C(S;c¤;pS)) = 0.
Since ¸¡S(C(S;c¤;pS)) = 0, Bayes rule do not apply and any beliefs can
be applied. Then, forall S ½ P and pS 2 XS such that ¸¡S(C(S;c¤;pS)) = 0,
we assume that beliefs are given by Pr
¤
k(S;pS).
25Case 2: ¸¡S(C(S;c¤;pS)) > 0.
Let ~ X¡S(pS) = fv 2 X¡S j (pS;v) 2 ~ Xg. Furthermore, as in Lemma 3,
we let ~ XS = fpS 2 XS j ¸¡S( ~ X¡S(pS)) = 1g. Clearly ¸S( ~ XS) = 1. Then,
for any pS 2 ~ XS such that ¸¡S(C(S;c¤;pS)) > 0 we have Prk(z j S;c
¤nhq;pS)
converges to Prk(z j S;c¤;pS), for all k = 2 S a.e. on X¡S. Then, by Sche¤é’s
Theorem (Billingsley (1968), p. 224), Prk(S;c¤;pS) = Pr
¤
k(S;pS) for all pS 2
~ XS.
Thus, for all S ½ P , all k = 2 S and all pS 2 ~ XS we have that beliefs
derived from c¤ are given by limit beliefs.
The idea behind the proof is the following. For each n, an equilibrium
c¤n 2 T exists from Proposition 1. Since T is compact there exists a conver-
gent subsequence, fc¤nhg1
h=1 with limit c¤ 2 T. Then, by repeatedly using
Helly’s Theorem, there exists a subsequence fc
¤nhqg1
q=1, such that, for all
S µ P, all k = 2 S we have Prk(S;c
¤nhq;pS) converges weakly to some measure
Pr
¤
k(S;pS). Then the pro…le c¤ 2 T and the beliefs given by the limit measure
is an INE a.e. If this where not the case, then for q su¢ciently large, c
¤nhq
cannot be an equilibrium.
3.3 Quadratic Preferences
Since the model in general is too complicated to solve analytically we restrict
the analysis in the remainder of the paper to quadratic preferences. Then
V (z ¡ x
i) = ¡(z ¡ x
i)
2:
26Given some S µ P, c 2 T and pS, let E [pk j S;c;pS] denote the expected
platform of party k and let V AR[pk j S;c;pS] denote the variance of the
platform of party k. Now consider two parties j and k. Quadratic preferences
implies that
xjk(S;c;pS) =
E [pk j S;c;pS] + E [pj j S;c;pS]
2
+
V AR[pk j S;c;pS] ¡ V AR[pj j S;c;pS]
2(E [pk j S;c;pS] ¡ E [pj j S;c;pS])
:
(9)







= ¡(E [xj j S;c;pS] ¡ x
i)
2 ¡ V AR[pj j S;c;pS]:
(10)







= ¡(E [xk j S;c;pS] ¡ x
i)
2 ¡ V AR[pk j S;c;pS]:
(11)
Setting expression 10 equal to 11 and solving for xi gives expression 9.
4 Extreme versus Moderate Parties
The main issue in this paper is what happens with campaigning and voter
ambiguity if parties become more or less extreme. To study this, let f be
symmetric with mean 0. We also assume f0(x) > 0 whenever x < 0. We
restrict attention to a situation with two parties where the Separability As-
sumption is satis…ed. Furthermore, let Xk = fpkL;pkHg where pkH = pkL+2l,
l > 0 and p2L = ¡p1H. Let X = X1 £ X2. Note that this is not a special
case of the set of admissible platforms described in section 3 above. The
27strategy space for party k is then ¹ Tk = fc j c : X ! [0;!]g. Let ¹ T = ¹ T1£ ¹ T2.
De…ne ± = E fp2g = ¡E fp1g as the mean of the prior distribution for party
2. Thus, a party is either far away from the median voter or close to the
median voter, relative to the expected platform. Also, by the Separability
Assumption we have p2L > 0 > p1H which implies ± > l. Each platform is
drawn with probability 1
2. This implies that the prior variance of the plat-
forms for both parties is l2. The parties have access to the same amount of
resources. Then, we let ! = !1 = !2. Let ck(p1i;p2j) be denoted ckij. Given
some p 2 X, and c;d 2 T, the votes for party 1 is















The following Lemma gives posterior variances and expectations when a
voter is reached by one party only. Then we are able to compute indi¤erent
voters when a voter is reached by one party only. Since we study symmetric
equilibria, we can deduce that the indi¤erent voter is at 0, when voters are
informed by none of the parties.
Lemma 5 Let c be a strategy pro…le. Suppose S = f2g. If p2 = p2i and
c2ji > 0 for some j 2 fL;Hg then
E [p1 j S;c;pS] = Efp1g + l
½(c2Hi)[1 ¡ ½(c1Hi)] ¡ ½(c2Li)[1 ¡ ½(c1Li)]
½(c2Li)[1 ¡ ½(c1Li)] + ½(c2Hi)[1 ¡ ½(c1Hi)]
28and
V AR[p1 j S;c;pS] = 4l
2 ½(c2Hi)½(c2Li)[1 ¡ ½(c1Li)][1 ¡ ½(c1Hi)]
(½(c2Li)[1 ¡ ½(c1Li)] + ½(c2Hi)[1 ¡ ½(c1Hi)])
2
for each i 2 fL;Hg.
Proof. Updating of voters. Since c2ji > 0 for some j 2 fL;Hg Bayes rule
applies.
Let S = 2. Bayes rule gives us






2 + ½(c2Hi)[1 ¡ ½(c1Hi)]
1
2
for i 2 fL;Hg. Let A1 = ½(c2Li)[1 ¡ ½(c1Li)] and B1 = ½(c2Li)[1 ¡ ½(c1Li)]+
½(c2Hi)[1 ¡ ½(c1Hi)] for i 2 fL;Hg. Then Pr1(p1L j 2;c;pS) =
A1
B1 and










Substituting in the expressions for A1 and B1 gives the desired result.
A similar result holds for party 2.
Now consider the optimal spending choice when a party is far away from
the median voter, relative to the voters prior.
Lemma 6 Suppose c¤ is a symmetric INE. For each i 2 fL;Hg we have
c¤
1Li = 0 and c¤
2iH = 0.
Proof. Consider party 1. By symmetry, a similar argument holds for party
2. Let c be an arbitrary symmetric strategy pro…le. By hypothesis, we have
p1 = p1L.
29Step 1: x12(1;c;p1) · x12(?;c;p?) and x12(12;c;p12) · x12(2;c;p2).
Case 1: x12(1;c;p1) · x12(?;c;p?).
We have
x12(1;c;p1) ¡ x12(?;c;p?) =
[p2
1L ¡ p2
2L Pr[p2L j 1;c;p1] ¡ p2
2H Pr[p2H j 1;c;p1]]
2(p1L ¡ E [p2 j 1;c;p1])
:
Since p1L < p2L < p2H and Pr[p2L j 1;c;p1] + Pr[p2H j 1;c;p1] = 1 the nu-
merator is nonnegative and since p1L < E [p2 j 1;c;p1] the denominator is
negative. Then x12(1;c;p1) ¡ x12(?;c;p?) · 0.
Case 2: x12(12;c;p12) · x12(2;c;p2).
We have
x12(12;c;p12) ¡ x12(2;c;p2) =
p1L ¡ E [p1 j 2;c;p2]
2
¡
V [p1 j 2;c;p2]
2(E [p1 j 2;c;p2] ¡ p2)
=
(p1L ¡ p1H)p1H Pr[p1H j 1;c;p2] + p2 (E [p1 j 2;c;p2] ¡ p1L)
2(E [p1 j 2;c;p2] ¡ p2)
:
Since (p1L ¡ p1H) < 0, p2 > 0, p1H < 0 and E [p1 j 2;c;p2] ¡ p1L ¸ 0 the
numerator is nonnegative. Also, since E [p1 j 2;c;p2] < p2, the denominator
is negative. Then we have x12(12;c;p12) ¡ x12(2;c;p2) · 0.
Step 2: c¤
1Li = 0. Since x12(1;c;p1)¡x12(?;c;p?) · 0 and x12(12;c;p12)¡
x12(2;c;p2) · 0 by Step 1, party 1 loses by informing. Note that this holds
for any symmetric strategy pro…le. Then c¤
1Li = 0. A similar argument holds
for party 2.
Thus, each party spends nothing if the realized platform is far away from
the median voter, compared with the prior. The reason is that, when in-
forming voters, the voters become aware of the platform of the party. Even
30though voters perceive the platform with certainty, the reduction in risk is
not su¢cient to counter the e¤ect that the platform is far away from the
median voter. This result makes it easy to compute expenditures for the
party.
Now consider the expenditures when parties have a realization of the
platform that is close to the median voter, compared with the prior. The
following Lemma shows that the spending level of a party is independent of
the realized platform of the other party.





Proof. Let c be an arbitrary symmetric strategy pro…le. Consider party 1.
By hypothesis we have p1 = p1H.
Step 1: The votes for party 1.






Case 1: p2 = p2L.
















































Case 2: p2 = p2H.
Then c¤
2HH = 0 and ½(c¤


















31Step 2: Optimal spending choice.
By symmetry, we have x12(2;c;p2) = ¡x12(1;c;p1). Then, by symmetry














f(y)dy ¡ 1 = 0 (14)
for all i 2 fL;Hg. Since expression 14 only depend on c2 through beliefs,
the optimal choice for party 1 is independent of the choice of c2, given voter
beliefs. This implies c¤
1HL = c¤
1HH. Then, let c¤
m = c¤
1HL denote the solution




In particular, we focus attention on stable equilibria.
4.1 Stability
To analyze stability, we consider an equilibrium and perturb the equilibrium
pro…le. The players take the new pro…le as given and reoptimize. This
again gives a new pro…le. Given this pro…le, the players reoptimize again
and so forth. This gives a system of di¤erential equations by using the …rst-
order conditions. Let c0 denote the starting value of c. Let the system of
di¤erential equations be denoted c(t). For all c;d 2 ¹ T, let kd ¡ cke denote
the (euclidian) distance between c and d. Let a solution to the system of
di¤erential equations be denoted Á(t;c0).





e · ´ ) lim
t!1Á(t;c0) = c
¤:
Let ¢ µ <++ denote the (open) set of possible parameter values of ±. The
following Lemma shows existence. The conditions on ½ and the distribution
are technical conditions that guarantees the existence of an interior solution.
Lemma 8 Suppose º½0(0)
z(0) R
0
f(y)dy ¡1 > 0, º½0(!)
z(!) R
0
f(y)dy ¡ 1 < 0 and
½0(0) < 1. There exists a symmetric, locally stable INE a.e. on ¢.
Proof. Symmetric equilibria.








(l ¡ 2± + [± ¡ l]½(b))
¸
:







f(y)dy ¡ 1 = 0:
This expression de…nes a mapping k : [0;!] ! [0;!], such that k(b) = cm.
Also, by construction, k(b) is the optimal campaign expenditure level for a







(l ¡ 2± + [± ¡ l]½(b))
2 > 0; (15)
33½0(cm) > 0 and ½00(cm) < 0 for any cm 2 (0;!), it follows that k is single-
valued and nondecreasing. The …xed points of the mapping k is the set of
symmetric equilibria. Since z is continuously di¤erentiable and ½ is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, if b 2 (0;!) and k(b) 2 (0;!), then k is di¤eren-
tiable.
Since k is a continuous function, there exists at least one symmetric equi-
librium.
Step 2: Using k to …nd a candidate equilibrium.


















Any …xed point satisfying 16 is a candidate equilibrium. Since k(0) > 0
and k(!) < !; Proposition 8.3.1 in Mas-Colell (1989) implies that there exists
such a …xed point for almost all ± 2 ¢.
Step 3: First, we show that we can restrict attention to the stability of
parties where the realized platform is close to the median voter.
Let B´(c¤) = fc j kc ¡ c¤ke < ´g. Suppose we start with some c 2 B´(c¤)
such that, a party with a platform that is far away from the median voter
spends a positive amount. Recall ½0(0) < 1.
Consider the best response, given some c. Suppose party 1 is far away
from the median voter. Let
¤1 = ½(c2Lj)[F(x12(12;c;p12) ¡ F(x12(2;c;p2))]
+[1 ¡ ½(c2Lj)][F(x12(1;c;p1)) ¡ F(x12(?;c;p?))]:
34If party 1 chooses a positive spending level, c0




1Lj)¤1 ¡ 1 = 0:
Since symmetry of the strategy pro…le is only used in Lemma 6 to show
x12(?;c;p?) = 0; Lemma 6 implies that F(x12(12;c;p12) · F(x12(2;c;p2)).
Also, we have x12(1;c;p1) < 0.




















1 = (1 ¡ ½(c1LL))(1 ¡ ½(c2LL)) + (1 ¡ ½(c1LH))(1 ¡ ½(c2LH));
A
?








(1 ¡ ½(c1ij))(1 ¡ ½(c2ij)):




2 and B? are continuous in
c, we have x12(?;c;p?) continuous in c. Moreover, if c ! c¤ then x12(?;c;p?)
converges to 0.
Then, for any ² > 0 there exists an ´ such that, if c 2 B´(c¤) then
jx12(?;c;p?)j < ².












holds for all c 2 B^ ´(c¤). Repeat this for all states where the platform of some
party is far away from the median voter. Let ~ ´ denote the value of ´ such
that, for all c 2 B~ ´(c¤), for all states where the platform of some party is
far away from the median voter, any such party choose zero spending. Since
x12(?;c;p?) is continuous in c and ½0(0) < 1, we have ~ ´ > 0.
Let B0
´(c¤) = fc j kc ¡ c¤ke < ´ and c1Li = c2iH = 0 for i = L;Hg. Thus,
B0
´(c¤) is the ball around c¤, given that parties far away from the median
voter spend zero. If c¤ is locally stable to changes in spending of parties that
have platforms close to the median voter, there exists a ¹ ´ > 0 such that, if
Á(t;c0) 2 B0
¹ ´(c¤) then limt0!1 Á(t0;c0) ! c¤ for t0 > t.
Now consider the solution to the …rst-order condition, given some c0 2
B~ ´(c¤). Let the solution to the …rst-order conditions be denoted c0¤. Since
votes for parties that have platforms close to the median voter are continuous
in c, for a su¢ciently small ´ · ~ ´, denoted ´0, if c0 2 B´0(c¤) then c0¤ 2
B0
¹ ´(c¤).
Thus, we can restrict attention to the case when parties are close to the
median voter and show that this system is stable.
Step 4: The system of di¤erential equations of parties with platforms
close to median voter.
Given i;j 2 fL;Hg, let ckij(t) denote the di¤erential equation for party k.
Using a …rst-order Taylor series expansion at c¤
m of the …rst-order conditions,
gives the system of di¤erential equation as
362
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@c1HH = ¡E and
@x12(?;c;p? )











m)D. Also, let ¹ f =
f(x12(2;c¤
m;p2)).






































































Step 5: Stability of system in Step 4.
For i = 1;2;3;4, let ¸i denote the eigenvalues of this matrix.































We have two cases.
If ½(c¤
































Clearly, by expression 16, ¸1 is negative.
If ½(c¤


































Clearly, by expression 16, the real part of ¸1 is negative.































We have two cases.
If ½(c¤





























Clearly, by expression 16, ¸2 is negative.
If ½(c¤

































Clearly, by expression 16, the real part of ¸2 is negative.














































m) < 0, we
have ¸3 < 0 and ¸4 < 0.
39Thus, the real parts of all eigenvalues are negative. Thus, any solution
c¤
m found in Step 2 is stable.
Note that ¸4 ¸ 0 for any …xed point such that k0(b) ¸ 1. Thus, the linear
approximation of the di¤erential equations used above is not stable for any
such …xed point.
Now consider the e¤ects of changes in ± on campaign spending. Let
· : ¢ !! [0;!] denote the correspondence that associates to each ± the set
of symmetric equilibria.
We have the following Proposition that shows that spending decreases
with polarization.
Proposition 2 Let c¤ be any stable symmetric INE, where c¤





Proof. Note that a stable equilibrium is locally isolated. Consider the e¤ects




















f(y)dy ¡ 1: (18)
Consider a linear approximation of · at (c¤
m;±). The linear approximation
isgiven by cm = ®c¤
m;±±+¯c¤
m;±. By using a linear approximation at an isolated







































m) ¡ 2] ¡ [l ¡ 2± + [± ¡ l]½(c¤
m)]]



















m < 0. If





The reason behind the result is the following. Note that, for …xed voter
beliefs about c¤
m, the positive e¤ect of reduced uncertainty on voters is un-
changed. Consider voters that are informed by, say party 1 only, and assume
that p1 = p1H. For the indi¤erent voter, the expected platform of party 2 is
closer to the voters’ peak than the actual platform of party 1. Since voters
are risk-averse the voter would otherwise strictly prefer to vote for party 1. If
both parties move closer to each other, then the actual and expected platform
moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak by exactly the same distance. By
strict concavity, the closer to the peak a platform is, the ‡atter preferences
are. Then, since the actual and expected platform of the two parties move
the same distance, the increase in payo¤ of voting for the party that informed
is bigger than the increase for the other party. Thus, the voter with peak at
x12(1;c¤;p1H) strictly prefers party 1. This makes parties gain more votes by
informing if the parties are moderates, when the realized platform is close to
zero. This can be seen in the …gure below, where the platform pro…le changes
from p to p0, by the distance ¢p.
41Figure 2: E¤ect on the Indi¤erent Voter Informed by Party 1 only when
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Since the parties spend nothing when they are far away from zero this
implies that both the mean and variability of spending increases when c¤
m
increases. The increase in spending also reduce the posterior variance associ-
ated with each party. This reduces the incentives to inform voters. However,
the reduction only partially counteracts the initial increase.
424.2 Voter Uncertainty
Reduction of voteruncertainty in thismodel comesfromtwodi¤erent sources.
First, an increase in spending leads to a bigger share of the electorate be-
ing informed. Then, since c¤
m increase as parties get closer to each other,
the share of the electorate that is informed increases. The second source
is that uninformed voters revise their beliefs, given the strategy pro…les of
the parties. How beliefs are revised can be analyzed by using the result in
Proposition 2. We have the following corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 If c¤ is a stable INE then the posterior variance is increasing
in ±.
Proof. Note that, given a symmetric equilibrium c¤, Lemma 5 implies that,
for any S such that k = 2 S for k = 1;2, we have
V AR[pk j S;c
¤;pS] = 4l

















d± < 0. Also, we have










The conclusion then immediately follows.
The fact that variability of expenditures increases as parties get closer to
each other, makes it possible for uninformed voters to make a more precise
prediction of the platform of the party. This in turn leads to the posterior
uncertainty associated with a particular party to decrease. Thus, the uncer-
tainty associated with the parties decrease, even for the uninformed voters.
435 Conclusions
The model described in this paper analyses political campaigning. We are
able to show existence of equilibrium under mild assumptions for an arbi-
trary number of parties. In general, it is di¢cult to explicitly solve for an
equilibrium. However, in a symmetric example with two parties we can show
that voters are more informed when parties are moderate, than when parties
are extreme.
The motivation is the following. If a party informs a voter, then the
party knows the platforms of that party with certainty. Thus, the risk of
voting for that party is eliminated. Consider voters that are informed by
one party only, say party 1, and assume that the platform of party 1 is
close to the median voter. For the indi¤erent voter, the expected platform
of party 2 is closer to the voters’ peak than the actual platform of party
1. Otherwise, since voters are risk-averse, the voter would strictly prefer to
vote for party 1. If both parties move closer to each other, then the actual
and expected platform moves closer to the indi¤erent voters peak by the
same distance. By strict concavity, the closer to the peak a platform is,
the ‡atter preferences are. Since the actual and expected platform of the
two parties move the same distance, the increase in payo¤ of voting for the
party that informed is bigger than the increase in payo¤ of voting for the
other party. Thus, the previously indi¤erent voter now strictly prefers party
1. The e¤ect makes parties gain more votes by informing when parties are
moderate. Since spending increases, voters are more informed when parties
are moderates. Thus extremism is bad in the sense that it leaves voters
uninformed.
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